INTRODUCTION
In recent years, corporations have devoted substantial resources to disaster relief worldwide.
1 For instance, Wal-Mart garnered favorable attention for its contributions in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast after Hurricane Katrina.
2 According to company press releases, Wal-Mart recently gave hundreds of thousands of dollars for disaster relief in Brazil following a flood, 3 and it has pledged millions in support of Japan in the wake of the tsunami. 4 Large corporations have not only the economic resources, but also the logistical capacity and operational expertise to make a difference in the first terrible days after a disaster. However, commentators disagree about how best to harness corporate resources to support disaster relief efforts. 5 This is not a new issue; the disaster law and policy discussion is only the latest iteration of a longstanding debate concerning the proper role of the corporation in society.
Broadly speaking, there are two frameworks for assessing corporate social responsibility: a -classical‖ framework that treats non-shareholder interests as outside the corporation's proper concern, and a -progressive‖ framework that encourages corporations to pursue a broader social agenda. 7 According to the classical framework, corporations contribute to society by maximizing profits for their shareholders. 8 On this view, giving managers discretion to use corporate resources for other purposes only exacerbates agency costs between the managers and the shareholders who entrust their capital to the corporation. 9 By contrast, the progressive framework emphasizes that corporations owe their existence to the state and benefit from limited liability and other special protections and thus concludes that corporations have a special duty to serve a broader community of stakeholders. 10 The corporate social responsibility debate has important implications for disaster law and policy. 11 At bottom, the issue is whether corporations can advance socially desirable objectives consistent with their primary obligation to earn a profit for their shareholders. 12 Some commentators contend that by enhancing public-private partnerships, government can 7. See JOHN R. DANLEY, THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATION IN A FREE SOCIETY 3 (1994) (identifying -classical‖ and -managerial‖ (i.e., -progressive‖) arguments concerning corporate responsibility). Similarly, Professor Harwell Wells contends that a binary structure underlies corporate responsibility debates from the 1920s to the present. Wells, supra note 6, at 81 (-From debate to debate, to be sure, the exact legal means for forcing managers and directors to assume a legal duty to nonshareholders changed, but the general form remains: duty to owners alone versus duties to many constituencies.‖).
8. For the best-known articulation of this view, see Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970 , at 33 (contending that management's -responsibility [to shareholders] is to conduct the business in accordance with their desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society.‖) (1997) . Also, redistributive decisions made by corporate managers may lack democratic legitimacy. See, e.g., DANLEY, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing that -debate over the appropriate corporate role remains a surrogate for debate over the appropriate role of government‖).
10. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Proposition: Saving the World With Corporate Law, 57 EMORY L.J. 948, 962-63 (2008) (contending that corporations -are state creations, and no state in its right mind would willfully allow for the creation of institutions as powerful as corporations unless there was a belief that, on balance, society would be better off because of their existence‖).
11. Disaster law has emerged recently as a field of academic inquiry. The first book to offer a comprehensive treatment appeared in 2006. See DISASTERS AND THE LAW: KATRINA AND BEYOND (Daniel A. Farber & Jim Chen eds., 2006). Disaster law, according to Farber and Chen, -is about assembling the best portfolio of legal rules to deal with catastrophic risks-a portfolio that includes prevention, emergency response, compensation and insurance, and rebuilding strategies.‖ Id. at xix. In this Article, we focus in particular on the legal rules that impact business recovery.
12. See DANLEY, supra note 7, at 3.
[VOL. 89:973 incentivize the use of private distribution networks like Wal-Mart's in a coordinated effort with public disaster response agencies. 13 With the right market incentives, corporations can be induced to perform a socially useful function.
14 Other scholars cite Wal-Mart's performance after Katrina as evidence that profit-oriented corporations already have appropriate incentives and will provide necessary relief on their own without the waste and mismanagement too often associated with public relief efforts. 15 On the other hand, some scholars contend that the business corporation's for-profit motivation should disqualify it from serving as a substitute for public disaster relief. 16 According to these commentators, essential government disaster relief functions must not be entrusted to private industry. 17 Indeed, commentators have argued that public-private partnerships are inherently dangerous because private corporations can exploit disaster to serve their own ends and will corrupt public institutions 14. This position is consistent with a broader argument that corporate philanthropy can also serve the goal of profit maximization. See successful response to Katrina, along with the failure of FEMA and other government agencies, seems to confirm the more general conclusion of modern political economy that private institutions better mobilize resources than do public agencies. To those steeped in the literature of modern Austrian economics, the new institutional economics, property-rights economics, and public-choice theory, Wal-Mart's superior performance comes as no surprise.‖); Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson (Feb. 28-Mar. 3, 2007) , available at http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_ research_citation/1/7/9/2/0/pages179200/p179200-1.php. in the process. 18 Thus, corporate altruism is not seen as a dependable substitute for an effective government-led response to disaster. 19 This Article contends that the standard story concerning corporate social responsibility is incomplete because it features only the largest, publicly traded corporations. 20 As a consequence, scholars have overlooked the contributions of closely held, locally owned businesses, whether corporations, LLCs, or even franchise establishments with owners who reside in the community. 21 Businesses are economic enterprises situated in a broader web of social networks. 22 When business owners live where their customers live, these social networks strengthen as business ties overlap with other networks (school, church, recreation) that together form the fabric of place. 23 Locally owned businesses play a critical role in long-term disaster recovery, not only because they are motivated to reinvest in their own communities, but because the investments have social and economic significance.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I contends that locally owned businesses have the social capital to help communities recover from 18 . See generally NAOMI KLEIN, THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 357 (2007) (contending that disasters may be used to implement broad political and economic changes that favor the interests of the powerful). One commentator points out that the disaster-capitalism theory seems to lack supporting evidence. See NAOMI ZACK, ETHICS FOR DISASTER 116 (2009). However, Klein's arguments concerning the -many ‗indirect costs' in the privatization of Katrina‖ appear to be well taken. Id. (noting that one contractor received $12,500 per dead body removed while -local morticians and volunteers were barred from helping‖).
19. For example, if corporations are more likely to contribute when there are public relations benefits for doing so, they may ignore serious harms to more isolated communities. McKendry, supra note 17, at 12. Also, within a profit-maximizing orientation, there are limits to corporate generosity and the needs of disaster-stricken communities may far exceed those bounds. Id. at 13-14.
20. See, e.g., David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 27 (1979) (stating that -because that is the type of corporation usually targeted for proposals of mandatory structural reform, I will confine my analysis of whether corporate altruism is a good thing to the case of the public firm‖ (citation omitted)); Wells, supra note 6, at 80 (observing that - [w] hen legal commentators discuss corporate social responsibility, they really mean the social responsibility of giant corporations‖).
21. [VOL. 89:973 disaster. Part II further defends the importance of social capital, arguing that social capital can enhance a disaster-struck area's prospects for recovery by solving economic coordination problems. Part III revisits the corporate responsibility debate and contends that the inclusion of closely held, locally owned businesses highlights social motivations for choice that neither position in the current debate captures. 24 Part IV argues that lawmakers and responsible officials should recognize the role of locally owned businesses in restoring normalcy after disaster and should include business-continuity measures in comprehensive disaster planning.
I. THE SOCIAL CAPITAL OF LOCALLY OWNED BUSINESS
Social capital -refers to the trust, social norms, and networks which affect social and economic activities.‖ 25 Among the most important social norms are -reliability, honesty, and reciprocity.‖ 26 Social capital is enhanced when individuals participate in group activities of various kinds and when those overlapping relationships enhance the overall level of trust. 27 In social networks characterized by high degrees of trust and reciprocity, -individuals and groups‖ are able -to accomplish greater things than they could by their isolated efforts.‖ 28 Social capital may also foster virtues such as volunteerism and civic engagement that are essential to the health of a community. 29 According to one scholar, -people who 24 . Going forward, we refer simply to locally owned businesses. By this, we do not mean to include the headquarters of national or multinational corporations. Nor do we include closely held businesses that have expanded well beyond a particular region and that may rival public corporations in size. In short, our focus is the local economy and the businesses that comprise it. trust others are all-round good citizens, and those more engaged in community life are both more trusting and more trustworthy.‖ 30 Social capital is an important factor in disaster recovery. 31 Rebuilding physical infrastructure alone is not enough. 32 Resilience appears to have more to do with social infrastructure than with economic capital: -Communities with more trust, civic engagement, and stronger networks can better bounce back after a crisis than fragmented, isolated ones.‖ 33 To a greater extent than is commonly recognized, -[n]eighbors and friendsnot government agencies or NGOs-provide the necessary resources for recovery after disaster.‖
34
This Part uses examples drawn from the Gulf Coast and New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina to contend that locally owned businesses have an essential role to play in restoring a community after disaster. When locally owned businesses survive, they not only restore economic vibrancy but also replenish and strengthen the community's social capital. Part I.A acknowledges that public corporations can provide crucial economic assistance and may aid in the restoration of physical infrastructure. Part I.B contrasts the economic role of public corporations with the potential value of locally owned businesses, arguing that local businesses are crucial to a disaster-impacted region's social infrastructure and residents' ability to return to a normal life.
35

A. Bottled Water, Pop-Tarts, and Generators
Wal-Mart's performance after Hurricane Katrina provides an excellent illustration of the potential value of large business contributions to disaster recovery. As is well known, the storm caught the Federal Emergency In New Orleans, once the flood receded and the initial phase of disaster relief ended, the status of local businesses became a vital indicator of the region's ability to recover. 61 When local bars, restaurants, and businesses committed to reopen, their perseverance gave the community hope and a renewed sense of normalcy. Among the local establishments that pledged to rebuild at almost any cost were well-known names such as the Camellia Grill, 62 Emeril's, 63 and Mother's. 64 Local owners who had a stake in their community refused to abandon restaurants and employees and often went to great lengths in order to get back what they had lost: -Many restaurants set up FEMA trailers so employees could return to the city. Some workers lived in restaurant parking lots, even in the owners' homes for months after the storm.‖
65
The importance of locally owned businesses to disaster recovery is difficult to measure because the businesses are part of an interconnected web of mutually reinforcing ties. As Professors Michael Heller and Rick Hills explain, Homeowners might build up sentimental attachments to property simply by living in it. They develop ties to neighbors through connections at local churches, favorite coffee shops, bars, clubs, or other familiar local watering holes-what some have called ‗social 60. Again, our claim is not that social capital is found only in local businesses, but that the corporate social responsibility debate focuses solely on economic power and governance issues in large corporations and thus overlooks questions of community connection that are also relevant to appreciating the role of the business corporation in society.
61 What is true in ordinary times remains true in extraordinary times: in the face of disaster, local businesses shore up the social capital that provides a bulwark against community dispersion.
Although large-scale corporations also make valuable contributions, especially in the immediate aftermath of catastrophic events, longer-term recovery requires the involvement of the affected population, including local businesses, to be successful. 67 A robust local business community enhances disaster resilience in part because the owners have obligations as members of the community and not just as rational economic actors. For instance, social ties may influence a decision whether to invest in recovery or to seek more attractive investment opportunities elsewhere. By persevering, local businesses help to sustain their communities.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF SOCIAL CAPITAL
In addition to providing non-economic rationales for choice, social capital can also influence economic decision-making. This Part contends that social capital creates economic opportunities that would not otherwise exist by overcoming barriers to collective action, encouraging the use of -voice‖ over -exit,‖ and reducing transaction costs. 68 Thus, social-capital theory is part of economics, broadly understood. First, social capital helps people resolve collective action problems: when people share social norms of mutual aid, free-riding is reduced. Second, social capital reduces transaction costs: -There is no need to spend time and money making sure that others will uphold their end of the arrangement or penalizing them if they don't.‖ Third, social capital increases a distinctive set of virtues, such as tolerance and empathy for others. Id.
A. Collective Action
Social dilemmas involving collective action arise when individually rational behavior leads to collectively irrational results. 69 The classic example of a collective action problem, sometimes called the -tragedy of the commons,‖ asks us to envision a field owned in common by many individual cattle herders and endangered by overgrazing.
70 This -is a story about a form of social interdependence in which the collective consequence of reasonable individual choices is disaster.‖
71
If each herder acts in the best interest of all, she will reduce her cattle's grazing allowance to a level that, if adopted by the other herders, would ensure the field's survival. The problem, though, is that each herder reaps the full benefit of the grazing that she permits her herd to engage in and shares the cost of overgrazing with all the other herders.
72 Therefore, the individually rational thing to do-the dominant strategy-is for a herder to allow her herd to graze as much as it wants. 73 To the extent that other herders restrain their herds, an individual herder's defection will allow her to maximize her own profits (fattening her cattle for sale) without paying any of the shared cost. Unfortunately, if the other herders make the same rational calculation, the field is doomed and the cattle will starve. 74. See Hardin, supra note 70, at 1244. (-[T]he rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another. . . . But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.‖) (ellipsis in original).
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76
Individually rational, disconnected individuals might hope that others would take the initiative to establish these services but would fail to -coordinate their efforts to bring about these desired outcomes.‖ 77 Why contribute to group needs when others may do the work for you, and, if they do not, your own efforts will be wasted? Social capital predicts disaster recovery because -[n]eighbors with greater levels of social capital share information about bureaucratic procedures and upcoming deadlines, monitor public space to prevent dumping, and deter looting in their community.‖ 78 By contrast, communities that lack social capital may remain stagnant, regardless of whether they receive public resources.
79
The collective action problem applies as well when individuals must decide whether to rebuild in a devastated community: -Survivors of Katrina did not want to return to be the only household on their blocks, as this could be risky due to both crime and a lack of social support.‖
80
Unless strong social networks and mutual trust offered assurances that others would return, the individually rational choice would be to leave or, at a minimum, wait to see what others decided. 81 local businesses committed to reopen in New Orleans, they sent a powerful signal that the community would be restored.
82
B. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
The economist Albert Hirschman offers another perspective for analyzing the fundamental stay-or-go decision residents made in the wake of Katrina, and for connecting economic choice with political alternatives. Framed in Hirschman's terms, the issue was whether individuals would seek to improve their circumstances (with -voice‖ metonymically representing the range of political actions available), or whether they would simply relocate somewhere else (the -exit‖ option).
83
As Hirschman observed, there are two basic options that individuals can choose when faced with declining quality in an organization. 84 First, there is the -exit‖ option: -Some customers stop buying the firm's products or . . . leave the organization.‖ 85 Shareholders in a publicly traded corporation typically react to negative information by selling stock. The resulting decline in the firm's market value sends a message to management to fix the problem. 86 No words are needed. Thus, because the message is communicated via market price information, Hirschman characterizes exit in economic terms. 87. Id. at 15-16 (-This is the sort of mechanism economics thrives on. It is neat-one either exits or one does not; it is impersonal . . . and success and failure of the organization are communicated to it by a set of statistics; and it is indirect-any recovery on the part of the declining firm comes by courtesy of the Invisible Hand, as an unintended by-product of the customer's decision to shift.‖).
88. Id. at 30 (-Voice is here defined as any attempt at all to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state of affairs . . . .‖). See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the [VOL. 89:973 communicated directly through interest articulation. 89 For instance, an unhappy consumer could write a letter of complaint to a business demanding better service. Or shareholders might seek to elect new directors or to push through a proposal for corporate change. In situations in which exit is more difficult-from families and nations, for instancevoice becomes correspondingly more important as a mechanism for change. 90 According to one commentator, -[s]trong social networks raise the cost of exit from a community and increase the probability that residents will exercise voice to join rebuilding efforts.‖ 91 Although the connection between social networks and exit cost is not elaborated, it seems plausible to suppose that an individual who benefits from reciprocal arrangements of trust in a particular community would be disinclined to start over among strangers elsewhere. The effort involved in replicating those arrangements as well as the uncertainty of result when engaging a foreign social network or creating one anew would increase the costs of exit.
92
These costs, in turn, make exit less likely.
In our view, however, social capital also has potential relevance as a way of elaborating -loyalty,‖ Hirschman's third, linking concept. In some situations, it may be unclear whether exit, voice, or some combination of the two is the right choice, and Hirschman surmised that loyalty among organization members would influence the decision. 93 When loyalty is high, a customer, shareholder, or community member will hesitate to 91. Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 7-8. 92. In accounting terms, this cost could be described as a loss of goodwill-the value of a business in excess of its assets that includes customer loyalty and reputation.
93. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 82 (-Loyalty is a key concept in the battle between exit and voice . . . .‖).
exit. 94 He or she is also more likely to use voice. 95 By contrast, when an individual feels no particular loyalty, exit may be the simpler, more rational decision. 96 Notably, the benefits Hirschman ascribes to loyalty are also the civic virtues that follow from high levels of social capital. As one scholar observes, focusing on a context in which social capital tends to be high, -virtually all forms of altruism-volunteerism, community projects, philanthropy, directions for strangers, aid for the afflicted, and so on-are demonstrably more common in small towns.‖ 97 After a disaster, these civic virtues become critically important because the community's survival depends upon mutual aid. 98 To the extent that social capital enhances loyalty, therefore, it may influence members of a community to use voice and to reinvest in the community. 99 For example, one researcher found substantial evidence that, in the wake of a major earthquake, the Tokyo neighborhoods with the most social capital experienced -stronger population recovery.‖ 100 Thus, social capital theory can be seen as a way of extending Hirschman's framework by providing a more robust theory of loyalty and trust.
101
C. Transaction Costs
Social capital may also facilitate rebuilding in the wake of disasters by reducing what economists refer to as transaction costs.
102 Before a market exchange takes place, the participants need to acquire information about the proposed transaction, they must negotiate the terms, and they must be able to monitor the other party's performance. Although some economic 97. PUTNAM, supra note 29, at 138. 98. See Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 6 (-Information and signals from civil society-such as ‗who is coming back when and what services will be provided'-are critical to decision-making processes of survivors, and cannot be replaced by government pronouncements.‖).
99. Also, in reciprocal social networks one might expect that one's view would at least be heard. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 83, at 37 (-[T]he decision whether to exit will often be taken in the light of the prospects for the effective use of voice. If customers are sufficiently convinced that voice will be effective, then they may well postpone exit.‖) (emphasis removed).
100 [VOL. 89:973 models assume zero transaction costs, most real-world exchanges involve significant costs. 103 When the costs are high, otherwise efficient exchanges may not take place. 104 Consider, for instance, the decision whether to open a restaurant in an area damaged by disaster. Although one might anticipate a market need that such a restaurant could serve, the first hurdle would be gathering information about the region. Are there reliable patrons? How does one acquire the necessary licenses to do business? Will suppliers sell food products at reasonable prices? Having gathered the necessary information-a time consuming and costly process-the prospective restaurant owner would need to negotiate with suppliers and hire people to build and to run the restaurant. Finally, the owner would need to invest substantial energy monitoring her employees to ensure that they devoted their full efforts to the business and did not shirk their duties. 105 An interested restaurant owner who is already part of a social network may benefit from reduced transaction costs for each of these tasks. First, information will be more readily available: the owner will know whom to ask, what to ask, and where to look. Second, negotiations within existing networks can be cheaper if trust exists as a lubricant. 106 Rather than negotiating each detail and worrying about whether the prices requested are fair, trust permits business participants to rely (to some degree) on the good faith of their counter-parties. Further, social capital ensures that the prices charged by suppliers, in fact, will be fair. 107 otherwise default in their duties, and this, in turn, lowers monitoring costs. 108 Thus, economic transactions in communities with high social capital can be more efficient.
The importance of social capital in reducing transaction costs is reflected in the ethnic homogeneity of many business communities, including, for instance, Korean grocers in New York, Pakistani and Indian budget motel owners in New York, and Soviet Jewish cab drivers in Los Angeles. 109 Of course, the connection of race, ethnicity, and social capital creates its own legal challenges and may have troubling implications concerning disaster resilience and diversity. 110 From an economic standpoint, however, social capital has clear advantages. Locally owned businesses, situated in particular communities, whether distinguished by ethnic or other markers, can take advantage of trust and social networks to reduce their costs of operation.
111 For communities to recover from disaster quickly, the efficient operation of locally owned businesses, and their ability to tap into existing social networks, may be critical. 114 Second, social networks are not usually built to serve economic purposes and are largely their own reward.
115 Thus, it is not clear to Arrow why social networks should count as -capital.‖ He contends that the metaphor is misleading and should be discarded.
116
Undoubtedly, social networks can be misused; they may help teenage gang members organize as easily as other social networks help adults monitor the neighborhoods in which those gangs operate. 117 Social capital is important, not because there can be any guarantee that the capital will always be spent towards worthwhile ends, but because it greatly increases the effectiveness of individual activity. The fact that social networks of trust can be misused only heightens the importance of understanding their character.
118
Further, although social capital is a metaphor, it is a helpful metaphor because it sharpens the distinction between conventional economic reasoning and the social factors that influence individual choice. Nothing turns on the fact that social capital is a metaphor-so is economic capital 120 and, for that matter, the idea of a financial marketplace.
121
However, Arrow may be right to worry about the -snare‖ of seeking to measure social capital with more precision than the concept will bear.
122
He suggests that
Instead of thinking of more and less, it may be more fruitful to think of the existing social relations as a preexisting network into which new parts of the economy (for example, development projects) have to be fitted. We would want to fit new projects so as to exploit complementarity relations and avoid rivalries. Of course, new projects will create their own unintended social relations, possibly destroying existing ones.
123
Even if social networks cannot be measured with great precision, it is evident that locally owned businesses benefit from them and that disaster development funds can work either with or against preexisting social networks. 124 Although we see no harm, and much benefit, in seeking tools to better evaluate social capital-how it is created, what enhances it, and what diminishes it-Arrow is surely correct that an analysis of the importance of social networks and bottom-up disaster recovery efforts need not depend on the details of any particular measurement of social capital.
Rather, highlighting the ways that economic behavior is situated in social context helps us avoid the mistake of assuming that outputs are connected to inputs by some mathematical, unvarying calculus. 125 In sum, although social capital is primarily a sociological tool and not an economic concept, its value to disaster recovery efforts can be described in the language of economics: (1) as a solution to collective action problems; (2) as an indicator of whether individual residents are more likely to choose -voice‖ or -exit‖ when the community suffers losses in a disaster; and (3) as a way of reducing transaction costs. 126 By sustaining a disasterstricken community's social capital, locally owned businesses have the potential to overcome economic coordination problems and to set the foundation for longer-term recovery.
III. REVISITING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Advocates of corporate social responsibility contend that corporations ought to do more than maximize returns for their shareholders and that -the legitimate concerns of a corporation should include such broader objectives as sustainable growth, equitable employment practices, and long-term social and environmental well-being.‖ 127 The debate among legal scholars concerning corporate social responsibility focuses on how managers resolve tradeoffs between the needs of society and the interests of the corporation's shareholders. 128 Cases in which those interests align are perceived as uninteresting or, worse, as phony justifications for corporate social responsibility. 126. See Harris, supra note 68, at 1458 (identifying first and third elements); Aldrich, Fixing Recovery, supra note 32, at 7 (identifying second element). Aldrich also discusses collective action problems, but he does not discuss conflicts between individual and collective rationality, and it is therefore not clear whether he means to employ the concept in its classic sense, or whether he is concerned more generally with the need to act collectively and to coordinate efforts. Mitchell ed., 1995) ).
129. Dean Gordon Smith puts the matter plainly: When boards of directors are able to enhance employee welfare, make the environment cleaner, or improve human rights throughout the world without impairing shareholder value, Part III.A evaluates the traditional theories of corporate social responsibility: classical and progressive. Part III.B contends that these theories are incomplete. By excluding closely held, locally owned businesses from the debate, the discussion has narrowly focused on governance issues between shareholders and managers in large business corporations. As a consequence, even advocates of corporate social responsibility have failed to fully consider how social capital can influence business choices.
A. Agency Costs and Moral Obligation
Classical and progressive theories of corporate social responsibility concern themselves with large, publicly traded corporations and offer two principal alternatives-that corporate managers benefit society indirectly by maximizing economic return for their shareholders or, alternatively, that managers should pursue other socially valuable goals, even at the cost of failing to maximize corporate profits. 130 Thus, the two camps give diametrically opposed answers to the same question. 131 For both classical and progressive scholars, the issue is the authority of corporate managers to decide to advance goals that provide no direct benefit for the corporation's shareholders. 
The Classical Framework
The dominant view of the corporation is that it is designed to maximize shareholder wealth. 133 However, the proposition that corporations contribute to society by facilitating the aggregation and growth of capital they often do it. This is not -corporate social responsibility,‖ but good management. And the failure to pursue such strategies would be a problem of managerial incompetence, not a problem of improper incentives. Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 1008 (citation omitted).
130. [VOL. 89:973 does not prohibit corporations from behaving responsibly in other ways. 134 Rather, it emphasizes the for-profit corporation's primary purpose: achieving lawful returns for its investors. 135 Any departure from wealth maximization adds -complexity‖ to the process by which shareholder investment drives economic activity.
136
If the fundamental question is -whether it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit voluntarily to identify and pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit,‖ 137 the classical position holds that the answer is no. This skepticism includes charitable donations and any activity that the corporation engages in with an objective other than maximizing shareholder profits.
138 Scholars operating within the classical framework identify several concerns associated with empowering management to follow a significantly more progressive agenda. Ordinarily, corporations obtain financing from shareholders and use it to purchase labor from employees, who in turn manufacture products that are sold to consumers. At the end of the day, consumers obtain a product in return for their payment, employees receive a wage for their labor, and shareholders get back a financial return on their investment. The production of altruism adds a layer of complexity to this process. When the corporation engages in philanthropy, it may satisfy the altruism demand of shareholders, employees, and consumers alike; every corporate stakeholder may feel good knowing that the firm is helping others. All three parties also pay: Consumers may pay more for the corporation's products, employees may take a lower wage to work for the corporation, and shareholders may accept a lower return on their investment. It is precisely this contortion of the usual producer-consumer relationship that makes corporate philanthropy controversial. 137. Engel, supra note 20, at 3 (-[T]he basic question of corporate social responsibility is not whether we wish to compel or forbid certain kinds of corporate conduct by legislative command . . . but rather whether it is socially desirable for corporations organized for profit voluntarily to identify and pursue social ends where this pursuit conflicts with the presumptive shareholder desire to maximize profit.‖). After all, if a particular course of action were truly calculated to earn greater profits for the corporation, now or in the future, then the corporation's managers would be expected to follow that course regardless of any inclination to behave -responsibly.‖ Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 1008.
138. See Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 573 (-Corporations do not merely channel funds to nonprofits, but do many things to help others at the expense of corporate profits.‖).
First, managerial discretion increases agency costs. An individual might spend discretionary income on charity but, in the context of a public corporation, -the pleasure taken . . . by the donors themselves‖ does not justify the use of shareholder money. 139 Yet, because the markets in which large corporations operate are not perfectly competitive and management decisions are protected by the business judgment rule, -the essential economic limit on the kinds of voluntarism we are discussing is the level of altruistic activity at which, were an outsider to try to wrest corporate control from the current managers and eliminate the altruistic practice, his expected gains from so doing would exceed his costs.‖ 140 The takeover constraint, however, leaves ample room for slack management, including deliberately non-wealth-maximizing choices. 141 Second, there is a concern about democratic legitimacy when a corporation's managers decide for themselves what social ends to pursue on behalf of society and how far to pursue those ends at the expense of shareholder profit. 142 The shareholders elect the members of the board, with voting weighted according to shares held, but board members and the corporate officers that they appoint are not public officials and have no direct role in democratic decision making. 143 Consequently, any distributive choices that they make absent specific legislative guidance may privilege certain objectives over others contrary to the real preferences of the relevant community.
Indeed, one scholar contends that legislative guidance would be necessary to support an argument that corporations can serve non-wealthmaximizing purposes:
One cannot persuasively claim to have found an extra-profit goal that society wants corporations to pursue, unless one can offer at 139. Engel, supra note 20, at 22 (-And as soon as the matter is put that way it becomes apparent, as a question of both law and policy, that this ‗consumption' justification just does not work with respect to corporate donations.‖) (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 25. -The less competitive the product market, the more the costs of altruism will be borne by the firm's customers rather than its shareholders.‖ Id.
141. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1997) (observing that formal oversight mechanisms including -the market for corporate control‖ fail -to provide a very robust check on managers‖ and offering alternative social explanations for the effectiveness of the corporate governance system).
142. Engel, supra note 20, at 30-31 (-Nor is there available-however much we might wish there were-any system of corporate ‗ethics' with which a given management can somehow legitimately and competently (but altruistically) make distributional decisions for the society.‖).
143. Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 582 (-Managers installed by shareholders to make money for shareholders are poorly positioned to know what the public good is or how best to deliver it.‖).
[VOL. 89:973 least a plausible explanation of why the legislature did not long ago enact liability rules, regulations, or other measures, to implement the goal in question quite independently of any management practice of social responsibility. 144 This is a puzzling claim, as it would seem to suggest that society does not want good Samaritans; after all, the law imposes no general duty to rescue.
145 Perhaps, as is true for individual persons, the required minimum does not exhaust the social obligations of corporations.
146 Also, the absence of mandatory regulation might be justified by administrative feasibility. The extent to which corporations ought to pursue non-profitmaximizing goals across a wide range of possible scenarios involves too many variables to reduce to a clear rule. 147 Third, to the extent socially responsible choices are mandated by government regulation, advocates of the classical framework raise a different kind of democratic objection: that government cooption will mean the loss of the corporation as an effective mediating institution between the all-powerful state and the individual citizen.
148 Also, such mandates may interfere with corporations' ability to generate profits, a loss of societal wealth that must be weighed against any benefits from greater corporate social responsibility. 146. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 131, at 567 (-[W]hile we acknowledge the legal right of citizens to do whatever they please within the bounds of the law, no society that ever existed has accepted the law as the only constraint on what is morally proper. On the contrary, every society we know of has encouraged its members to channel and temper their impulses by reference to moral codes, to engage in reflective ethical reasoning, even simply to practice good manners . . . .‖).
147. See id. at 568 (-[A]ttempts to enforce all social desiderata through law are costly. These costs include not only the obvious monitoring and enforcement costs-expenditures in the narrow sensebut also less tangible social costs, such as the costs of enlarging the role of government while atrophying the moral timbre of the individual citizen.‖).
148. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 897 (arguing that the -subordination of economic institutions to the state poses a grave threat to personal liberty‖). Professor Bainbridge contends that large corporations represent -an intermediary institution standing between the individual and Leviathan.‖ Id.
149. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 745 (2005) (-Arguments that socially responsible conduct would increase profits are . . . probably less about identifying profit-maximizing opportunities that corporations have missed than about helping create a patina of conceivable profitability that makes it easier for managers to engage in conduct that really sacrifices expected corporate profits.‖).
The Progressive Framework
For progressive scholars, the true value of corporations' wealthgenerating activities is overstated, because the stock price does not fully reflect the costs to the environment, to labor rights, and even the basic social structure of society. 150 The advocates of corporate social responsibility are not content with existing law that invests boards with the legal power to consider other stakeholders. 151 Rather, in some fashion, progressive scholars -want to impose on corporate decision-makers a legal duty to take into account the interests of the corporation's other constituencies, most often their employees and the communities where they are based.‖ 152 Greater social responsibility might be achieved by imposing a fiduciary duty on management to consider the interests of other stakeholders. 153 Alternatively, corporate law might facilitate more inclusive decision making by giving non-shareholder constituencies a direct role in management. 154 In opposing the classical view, progressive corporate law scholars list a number of problems with unfettered corporate power. First, progressive scholars contend that economic power has become too concentrated and that the largest corporations threaten democracy.
155 Second, they contend 150. See, e.g., Lynne Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 35, 36 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (contending that -market theories define efficiency too narrowly and that efficiency cannot be separated from concepts of social justice and normative goals.‖); Greenfield, supra note 10, at 951 (-Given their nature, governance, and objectives, corporations fail in predictable ways. They produce costly externalities; they are amoral; they fail to sustain implicit or explicit commitments to communities; they privilege some stakeholders (shareholders) at the expense of others (for example, employees).‖); David Millon, Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1378-79 (1993) (-For example, a plant closing may serve the interests of shareholders while imposing substantial uncompensated costs on laid-off workers and on a local community that has made infrastructure investments in the expectation of a continued corporate presence.‖).
151. Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 1000-01 (-Even if one were dissatisfied with the results of director discretion, it is clear that the U.S. corporate governance system already contains a substantial dose of ‗stakeholder governance.'‖ (citation omitted)).
152. Wells, supra note 6, at 80-81. 153. See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 952 (-The law could recognize non-shareholder stakeholders as important non-equity investors in the firm, and the legal obligations of the board could be expanded to require it to look after the interests of those non-equity investors. The same duties of care and loyalty that are owed to shareholders would be owed to non-equity investors.‖).
154. See id. (-More provocatively, the board's makeup could be broadened to include representatives of non-equity investors. This would lead, almost inevitably, to the more equitable distribution of the corporate surplus among the firm's equity and non-equity investors, which would inure to the benefit of both society and the firm over time.‖).
155. See Greenfield, supra note 10, at 951 (-They manipulate regulatory oversight and exert disproportionate political power.‖); Lawrence E. Mitchell, 156 For instance, even accepting the proposition that corporations maximize wealth for the working class and the wealthy, progressive scholars question whether economic wealth is the same as welfare. 157 Third, progressive scholars argue that the various constituencies affected by corporate activity cannot always bargain contractually to protect their interests.
158
Without significant public regulation, disparities of information and power make it unlikely that corporate governance will aim toward socially acceptable outcomes. 159 Finally, advocates of greater corporate responsibility contend that the wealth-maximization project fails on its own terms. 160 Rational economic actors could not generate the trust necessary for their markets to operate effectively. Indeed, -[a] paradox arises in these situations-the conscious pursuit of self-interest is incompatible with its attainment.‖ 161 There is a moral dimension to the analysis: -For the model to work, satisfaction from doing the right thing must not be premised on the fact that material gains may later follow; it must be intrinsic to the act itself.‖ 162 Although the details of the classical and progressive positions exceed the scope of this Article, it should already be clear that the scholars associated with each camp disagree on almost every significant point concerning corporate social responsibility. review) (identifying anti-democratic dangers of finance theory); Wells, supra note 6, at 80 (-The initial debate over corporate social responsibility emerged out of, and cannot be understood apart from, a vision of the American economy that first took root in the 1920s. That vision sees the American economy dominated by a small number of gigantic, stable corporations that essentially control the nation's business.‖). According to Professor Wells, progressive scholars in each generation have worried that -[n]ot only do these corporations dominate American business, but they will, if left unchecked, continue to accrue economic, political, and social power.‖ Id.
156. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 948 (-The race for profits led corporations to massive layoffs to undo the burdens of the age of hierarchy, first of the traditionally vulnerable blue-collar worker whose vulnerability had been enhanced by his loss of union power, and then of the newly vulnerable whitecollar worker.‖).
157. Id. at 964 (-One's psychological measure of well-being is dependent on far more than the simple metric of absolute wealth.‖).
158. Millon, supra note 150, at 1379 (-Accordingly, one way in which communitarians differ from contractarians is in their greater willingness to use legal intervention to overcome the transaction costs and market failures that impede self-protection through contract.‖).
159. Id. 160. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 10, at 966 (-The argument, as I understand it, is that corporate managers best advance society's interests by ignoring them. And not only should managers ignore social welfare, but they should be required to ignore it. Not even Adam Smith's invisible hand was assumed to be so powerful that people should be prohibited from taking the interests of others, or society in general, into account.‖).
161 Notwithstanding their deep substantive disagreements, though, classical and progressive scholars generally accept that the issue is whether large, publicly traded corporations can serve interests aside from wealth-maximization for their shareholders. 163 In other words, although they reach starkly different conclusions, corporate law scholars of both stripes address the same fundamental question. Consequently, the corporate social responsibility literature has almost nothing to say about the potential role of smaller, locally owned business.
B. Beyond Agency Costs
We contend that, as it has been framed, the corporate social responsibility debate has produced diminishing returns. 164 First, whatever adjustments might be made at the margin, 165 the locus of power in a public corporation will remain the board of directors. 166 Second, despite the maxim that managers should seek to increase profits for the shareholders, 167 corporate law rules permit managers to make charitable contributions and to take into account other interests. 168 If the managers of 163 . See Wells, supra note 6, at 79 (contending that the debates concerning corporate social responsibility have all been -premised on the idea that the American economy was dominated by a relatively small number of enormous, powerful, and stable business corporations that were qualitatively different from their smaller competitors‖).
164. See Wells, supra note 6, at 78: Contemporary works on corporate social responsibility touch on deep and important questions: what does the corporation owe to its shareholders? to its workers? to the larger community? But there is a problem with these debates: they rarely seem to go anywhere. Viewed in historical perspective, it is clear that each new round of debate on corporate social responsibility largely recapitulates the earlier debate in a slightly altered form. 168. Delaware law, for instance, specifically authorizes managers to -[m]ake donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or educational purposes.‖ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(9) (2006). These contributions must be reasonable but management decision making is protected by the business judgment rule and, absent self-dealing or other breaches of fiduciary duty, essentially unreviewable. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277, 286 (1998). From a strictly legal standpoint, there may not be much more to say. See Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 990 (-Pared to its core, ‗corporate law' is the set of rules that defines the decisionmaking structure of corporations.‖).
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170
Separating ownership from control enables capital aggregation through passive investment, 171 but the division of responsibility also produces agency costs to the extent that managers can find ways to prefer their own interests.
172 Thus, if public corporations are the main characters in a story about social responsibility, it should not be surprising to find that agency costs are central to the plot. Framed in terms of agency costs, the corporate responsibility debate concerns the extent of management's power to serve non-shareholder interests rather than the reasons that could motivate a rational business corporation to choose to pursue socially useful objectives.
A fuller account of corporate responsibility might begin, therefore, by considering the range of available business entities, closely held and publicly traded. Changing the scope of the inquiry adjusts the perspective. For instance, the agency-cost story of corporate social responsibility has little relevance in closely held businesses that are not characterized by a separation of ownership and control. 173 Once shareholder and manager interests align, the corporate governance problem recedes, and it becomes 169. Smith, Response, supra note 9, at 996 (-While changes in the composition of the board of directors may have some marginal effects on corporate decisionmaking, market forces severely constrain the range of options available to the boards of large, publicly traded companies.‖). As Dean Smith puts it, -powerful capital and takeover markets provide strong incentives for corporate managers to maximize profits.‖ Id. 173. See McWilliams, supra note 171, at 901 (-By contrast, the close corporation manifests agency efficiencies in terms of unity of interest among active long-term investors, policymakers, and managers-different models altogether, distinguished in particular by the distinct roles of the residual claimants.‖).
possible to consider other, under-explored issues of corporate responsibility.
There is no evidence to support a claim that any pursuit of social responsibility controverts the -pure‖ business decision that would otherwise be generated through the economic calculation of an autonomous, disassociated entity. Except for a few specialized contextssuch as market trading-business transactions are neither anonymous nor arms-length. Rather, business relationships are situated within a wider sphere of social intercourse. An expanded account of corporate social responsibility should include social motivations for choice and the socially embedded nature of economic activity. To frame a business decision in binary terms as profit seeking or altruistic is already to misunderstand the social context in which businesses operate.
174
For a smaller, locally owned business, the line between profit seeking and community obligation may not even be intelligible. 175 Locally owned businesses exist in particular communities and rely upon reciprocal community obligations. These networks of trust and mutual support are social capital and enable a business to operate and to earn a profit. At the same time, they motivate the business owners to behave in a socially responsible fashion even at the expense of short-term profits. Although all business activity takes place in a social context, local business owners are especially likely to perceive their business interests as part and parcel of a broader set of interconnected social relationships. 176 Just as human beings often have a variety of motivations, it may not matter to the owners whether a particular decision serves a business need or reflects a social obligation. 177 174. See FLIGSTEIN, supra note 125, at 18 (describing -social structures in markets‖ in terms of a -search for stable interactions with competitors, suppliers, and workers‖). However, a full exploration of economic sociology is beyond the scope of this Article.
175. For instance, if a local business owner provides temporary shelter for employees who are helping her restore her business, is that a charitable act or a business decisions?
176. To our knowledge, there has been only one empirical study comparing the levels of assistance provided after a natural disaster by locally owned and national corporations. See Okmyung Bin & Bob Edwards, Social Capital and Business Giving to Charity Following a Natural Disaster: An Empirical Assessment, 38 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 601, 602 (2009) (finding that -[l]ocal branches of national chains were less likely than locally owned franchises to provide assistance to employees and less likely than independent local businesses to provide in-kind contributions to local relief and recovery efforts‖).
177. See Stone, supra note 131, at 559 (-It has always seemed to me that the best way to supply some hard content to the notion of corporate social responsibility is to go back and examine the general issue, what ‗being responsible' entails when our subject is not corporations, but ordinary flesh and blood mortals. What are we driving at when we enjoin an ordinary person to be responsible?‖).
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To be sure, there remains a tension between profit seeking and social responsibility, and it is important to acknowledge the existence of tradeoffs, or else the problem of choice would dissolve. However, analysis of locally owned businesses shows that social responsibility and investor interests are not necessarily in conflict. First, decision-making occurs in an atmosphere of substantial uncertainty and there may be more than one plausible path toward profit. 178 Decisions about marketing, product development, and the like can be approached in different ways. In a complex business environment, taking account of multiple time horizons, the more profitable course of action will not always be clear and greater attention to the social consequences of corporate decisions would not necessarily implicate profitability. 179 Second, even if a particular decision would sacrifice profits in order to serve some other purpose, or at least was not reasonably calculated to maximize profits, the business owners have substantial latitude to pursue any course they choose. Most locally owned businesses are closely held. Unlike public corporations, closely held businesses do not implicate Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means' famous diagnosis that corporate law is characterized by a fundamental separation of ownership and control. 180 In closely held businesses, ownership and control overlap, 181 and the owners may have strong social as well as business motivations for responding to community needs. Thus, we can ask the question a different way-how can the shareholders maximize the value of their investment? If all participants agree that value can be measured not solely in economic terms, then a model that divides altruism and profit seeking may ignore the owners' own judgments about value. 182 178. See id. at 568 (-In the life of the enterprise, there are many occasions on which the managers have no ‗most profitable' option lying on their desks. Considering the uncertainties in any business' environment and the limited data available to it, there will be some range of choices all equally consistent with that ill-defined and elusive favorite of the economics textbooks, the investment uniquely calculated to maximize the shareholders' wealth.‖).
179. See Engel, supra note 20, at 9 n.30 (-It is, of course, a question of degree whether a given corporate action, not justified in terms of short term profits, is motivated, in whole or in part, by an expectation that it will augment long term profits, or solely by a desire to do the right thing in the society even at some risk to long term profits.‖). This holds true for public and private corporations. 182. Cf. Engel, supra note 20, at 22 (contending that the justifications for individual and corporate altruism must be different, because if all other justifications were removed -there would remain one vitally important justification applicable only to individual giving: the pleasure taken from it by the Third, locally owned businesses strengthen the communities in which they reside. A local business not only provides goods and services, and sometimes employment opportunities, but, at the same time, builds social networks. Thus, even under a skeptical view of corporate responsibility in which -a corporation should only engage in philanthropy when it is efficient for it to do so, that is, when it has a comparative advantage over other corporations and, importantly, nonprofit organizations and the government,‖ 183 we might conclude that locally owned businesses have an indispensable role to play in their communities.
Nor is there a serious concern about democratic legitimacy. Locally owned businesses are not even arguably competitors with the nation state in terms of size and influence. They aggregate capital and may benefit from limited liability but do not have concentrated economic power.
184
When ownership and control are united, the use of corporate resources reflects the preferences of the residual beneficiaries of the firm's profits and not a quasi-governmental redistribution of their wealth.
IV. RESTORING NORMALCY
In the context of disaster, the arguments against a progressive vision of corporate social responsibility lose much of their force. 186 Disasters can involve harms of the most serious order, potentially including loss of life, donors themselves-the aspect of charitable giving that resembles any consumption expenditure. The analogous rationale, with respect to corporate donations could not, as a practical matter, rest on any pleasure taken by the shareholders. Rather, it would have to involve the gratification felt by management. And as soon as the matter is put that way it becomes apparent, as a question of both law and policy, that this ‗consumption' justification just does not work.‖) 183. Henderson & Malani, supra note 136, at 576. Professors Henderson and Malawi focus on public corporations and offer the example of -Starbucks [which] can offer its coffee consumers the ability to help . . . farmers by purchasing fair trade coffee. Economists call this ‗economies of scope,' and it is something corporations likely have that most nonprofits do not.‖ Id. at 575.
184. Thus, political influence must usually be gained through trade associations or community politics.
185. For purposes of this argument, we assume that the owners are all in agreement. However, when majority owners use corporate resources for community purposes, it can at least be said that they are spending their own money as shareholders.
186. Finally, although it is not the argument we explore here, we note that even assuming that some management decisions work against corporation's own profitability, major disasters may be a special case and support a different standard for corporate responsibility. that a disaster is -a sudden, calamitous event that seriously disrupts the functioning of a community or society and causes human, material, and economic or environmental losses that exceed the community's or society's ability to cope using its own resources‖).
188. Cf. Engel, supra note 20, at 27 (defending -proposition that any social goal to be pursued by public corporations should have two closely related characteristics: first, a broad social consensus should support corporate pursuit of the particular goal in question; and second, some kind of reasonably clear social signal should be available to help each corporation figure out what actions are in furtherance of the goal.‖ (citations omitted)). According to Professor Engel, profit maximization is the goal most likely to satisfy his proposed test. Id. at 28.
189. See AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 558 (2002) (observing that -‗incompletely theorized agreements' may be quite important for agreed public decisions‖ and that -[a] consensus on public decisions may flourish so long as the exact grounds for that accord are not very precisely articulated‖) (citing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)). Thus, in the wake of disaster, there seems to be little basis for Professor Engel's assertion that -I think no one would claim we have any very satisfactory ways-whether by philosophical inquiry or social scientific research-of ever saying with certainty that ‗Society wants this done, even though the legislature hasn't gotten around to it.'‖ Engel, supra note 20, at 59. This is by no means a thoroughgoing rebuttal of Professor Engel's argument, only a suggestion that there are, in fact, situations that command a broad consensus concerning the need for all responsible actors to help in whatever fashion they are able.
190. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 898 (-Economic liberty, in turn, is a necessary concomitant of personal liberty; the two have almost always marched hand-in-hand. . . . Accordingly, it seems fair to argue that the economic liberty to pursue wealth is an effective means for achieving a variety of moral ends.‖).
191. Moreover, although specific disasters may occur with little warning; there are a series of disaster plans in place at the national, state, and local level that embody society's commitment to come to the aid of disaster victims. Further, there is general consensus, and some legislation, prohibiting -price gouging.‖ See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT'S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 4-5 (2009). These laws offer specific guidance to corporations and other businesses that the profit-maximization rules are, at least to that degree, suspended. But see John Shahar Dillbary, Emergencies, Body Parts, and Price Gouging, in LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009) (contending that high prices help markets allocate goods and services efficiently and do not evidence a failure of market ordering).
The case for the active involvement of locally owned business in disaster relief is even stronger. Unlike large public corporations, local businesses largely sidestep objections to corporate social responsibility based on agency costs or democratic accountability. Further, there is less reason to worry about a misallocation of resources if corporate managers are empowered to pursue non-wealth-maximizing goals. Locally owned businesses and their managers will be attuned to the community's priorities in the wake of disaster and well positioned to act. Indeed, in some cases a disaster response spearheaded by locally owned businesses may have more perceived legitimacy than the efforts of outside government officials.
192
Our principal aim in this Article is more theoretical than practical: We contend that locally owned business is vital to disaster recovery. Although we do not offer specific policy guidance, we conclude with two general considerations. First, locally owned businesses must survive before they can help their communities. Therefore, disaster plans should recognize a need to provide financial assistance to help locally owned businesses surmount short-term cash flow problems. Also, disaster planning should include tools to help local businesses cope with bureaucratic obstacles to restoring a previous business plan or developing a new strategy in response to changed needs in the community. As a general principle, legal rules should be designed to encourage local businesses to adapt entrepreneurially to the post-disaster landscape.
Second, public officials can help locally owned businesses by respecting limits to the appropriate involvement of outside authorities. In particular, public relief efforts should strive to avoid duplication of tasks better left to local businesses and other community organizations.
193
Advance planning is important in this regard, because longer-term consequences may not seem as pressing, and yet those potential costs must be weighed against shorter-term benefits. For instance, providing free food over a long period of time and without need-based constraints could cripple the prospects for local grocery stores. Without a business sector, a 192. Admittedly, coordination problems can arise if businesses operate without any central supervision. In Haiti, for example, the weakness of the central government and its perceived corruption has led to a proliferation of Non-Governmental Organizations (-NGOs‖). Yet, the relief agencies sometimes lack knowledge of community needs. See, e.g., José De Córdoba, Aid Spawns Backlash in Haiti, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 2010, at A1 (noting that aid has largely bypassed a corrupt and incompetent local government but that -there is little coordination among the NGOs or between the NGOs and Haitian officials‖).
193. This point applies as well to non-profit aid workers and charitable organizations.
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A. Post-Disaster Entrepreneurship
By sending signals about the health of the community and its ability to recover from disaster, rebuilding efforts led by locally owned businesses can accomplish more than well-intentioned programs implemented by government or outside relief agencies. As noted previously, strong community ties make local business more likely to stay and rebuild.
194
Even so, the decision to rebuild will not always be clear. 195 The benefits of social capital can be gleaned, in part, from its apparent absence in Mr. Zuriff's decision-making. Residents of communities with high levels of social capital are inclined to -work for a solution‖ rather than to leave, because they -have more at stake should the neighborhood ou can see the survivors making the choice as they walk through the debrisstrewn main street of Otsuchi in Japan-stay or go?‖). As the author observes, the -dilemma is the same for them all: do you stay and rebuild in a devastated small town, struggling economically even before the tsunami, or pull up stakes and start anew in a big city?‖ Id.
196 not recover successfully.‖ 199 However, local businesses will not stay to contribute unless they have a business plan that makes sense. The social context for economic activity does not obviate the need to bring in revenue and generate profits.
Disasters upend existing businesses and require owners to -revisit activities typically associated with the start-up phase of the business life cycle.‖ 200 To restore operations, a local business must reassemble its employees, its management team, its physical headquarters, and it must quickly establish a source of revenue. 201 Also, the business owners will engage in strategic planning to decide how to address new opportunities and the possible foreclosure of an existing business model. 202 In all these respects, the post-disaster context is analogous to the situation faced by a new, start-up business. In fact, -some businesses become quite entrepreneurial during a disaster response and surviving businesses can contribute quite early to assist in disaster recovery, if officials understand their needs.‖ 203 FEMA has circulated for comment a draft National Recovery Framework that recognizes a role for locally owned business in disaster recovery. 204 The Framework states that local businesses are -crucial in restoring the economic health of a community.‖ 205 Also, the Framework asserts that disaster recovery requires more than the rebuilding of physical infrastructure: -It focuses on how best to restore, reconstruct and redevelop the social, natural, and economic fabrics of the community. Yet, if locally owned businesses can help the members of a disasteraffected community to overcome collective action problems, then signals sent by revitalized businesses could be an important factor in individual decisions to return. 211 As one commentator observes, local commercial activity is a kind of -[m]utual assistance‖ in that it -serves as a source of material support, but, more important, it sends signals that members of a community are committed to recovery and helps to restore the fabric of communities torn apart by disaster.‖ 212 Therefore, -[o]nce . . . immediate concerns are met, the reestablishment of working social and economic systems ought to take priority because they are the foundation on which long-term recovery must be constructed.‖ 213 Accordingly, the Framework's intermediate goals would seem to benefit from earlier, more sustained attention to the needs of local businesses. For many such businesses, recovery must be early or not at all. If permission to rebuild cannot be acquired swiftly, a business may simply run out of operating capital or decide to relocate. The loss costs the community both economic and social resources, but the current Framework appears to assign only an economic value to locally owned businesses: -Businesses play a critical role in the stabilization and Tonight, I propose the creation of a Gulf opportunity zone, encompassing the region of the disaster in Louisiana and Mississippi and Alabama. Within this zone, we should provide immediate incentives for job-creating investment; tax relief for small businesses; incentives to companies that create jobs; and loans and loan guarantees for small businesses, including minority-owned enterprises, to get them up and running again. It is entrepreneurship that creates jobs and opportunity. It is entrepreneurship that helps break the cycle of poverty. And we will take the side of entrepreneurs as they lead the economic revival of the Gulf region. 215 While the reviews of the Gulf Zone Opportunity Act of 2005 (-GO ZONE‖) 216 have been mixed, the general principle seems correct. 217 Government assistance, whether in the form of tax incentives, loans, or direct payments, can give locally owned businesses a chance to succeed in the aftermath of disaster. In turn, the viability of local business strengthens a community's social networks and has a multiplier effect on the overall prospects for recovery. Recognizing the importance of the business community, -states are beginning to create business emergency operations centers within their emergency management teams, which increases communications between the private and public sectors during emergencies and strengthens overall [VOL. 89:973 disaster response and recovery efforts.‖ 218 These efforts appear to focus on the establishment of public-private partnerships rather than on the standalone value of local business. However, both FEMA and the Small Business Administration (-SBA‖) provide materials to help local businesses plan for disaster. 219 Moreover, disaster recovery loans are available from the SBA for qualifying businesses. 220 By providing information and financial resources, governments at the federal, state, and local level can help businesses make entrepreneurial investments in community recovery.
B. Market-Distorting Signals
Current disaster law and policy often misses opportunities to help locally owned businesses restore their communities after catastrophe and sometimes actually works at cross-purposes, diminishing their social capital. 221 Top-down relief efforts are necessary in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, but care should be taken to avoid stifling local recovery efforts, including the repair of social networks: -Noise emanating from policies can muffle [recovery] signals, however-or squelch them altogether by failing to provide and enforce the rules of the game for rebuilding or by creating rules that forbid or delay such reopenings . . . .‖ 222 Thus, locally owned businesses should not only be recognized in the broader context of corporate social responsibility, but should also be included in disaster planning.
In particular, public relief efforts should take care to avoid squelching the efforts of locally owned businesses. If the ultimate goal of disaster relief efforts is to help a community recover fully from disaster, then a particular -hazard of in-kind charitable or volunteer activity is that it will compete with and harm still viable commercial enterprises, undermining the community's long-term economic viability.‖ 223 Thus, according to one scholar, the slow pace of recovery in New Orleans may have been attributable to an excess of -orchestrated and centralized government effort‖ rather than a -lack of government resources.‖ 224 On this view, by taking over recovery efforts, -public policy is distorting the signals emerging from markets and civil society that would otherwise foster a swift and sustainable recovery.‖ 225 Whether this criticism of post-Katrina recovery efforts is warranted, we contend that government-sponsored disaster relief should acknowledge the vital role of social capital in longer-term community life recovery and should include locally owned businesses in comprehensive disaster planning:
Not only the built environment matters in people's assessment of whether their community is rebounding, but also the return of social systems that connect individuals and their families to one another through formal and informal neighborhood groups and through the services and social spaces created by schools, businesses, religious groups, and nonprofit organizations. In such a context, the signals coming out of civil and commercial society-signals about who is coming back and when, and what services will be provided-play a critical role in the recovery process.
226
Social systems are not a secondary consideration: once government officials have coordinated immediate rescue and relief measures to save lives and mitigate ongoing safety hazards, the longer-term recovery plan should include efforts to strengthen any signals of recovery that the community can generate and, at a minimum, should avoid stifling those signals.
FEMA's draft Framework explicitly recognizes the importance of inclusive planning and that -non-governmental partners in the private and non-profit sectors (i.e., local businesses, owners and operators of critical . Professor Horwich offers an example of this from his study of the Kobe earthquake. Id. (noting that -private for-profit medical clinics complained that the Red Cross hospitals were providing relief care well past the time it was justified.‖).
224. Chamlee-Wright, supra note 82, at 237 (arguing -that government policy and programs are the principal source of the problem‖). Given the overall climate of neglect in some of the poorest neighborhoods, there would seem to be room for an argument that aid programs were also misdirected. However, a full analysis of the allocation of relief resources in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast is beyond the scope of our current project.
225. Id. 226. Id. at 238.
[VOL. 89:973 infrastructure and key resources; and voluntary, faith-based and community organizations, foundations, philanthropic groups and academic institutions) play a significant role in meeting local needs.‖ 227 This is a key issue and worth emphasizing. In providing disaster relief, there is a fine line between the supply of necessary assistance and the dampening of organic recovery efforts. The first, overriding priority is to save lives and to mitigate suffering. However, well-intentioned aid can produce unintended consequences. Humanitarian assistance may actually undermine long-term development goals. Poorly thought through aid can have unfortunate consequences for locally owned businesses.
For example, one study of small business recovery after Hurricane Katrina reported the negative reaction of business owners to outside relief efforts coordinated by FEMA. 228 These reconstruction efforts focused on physical infrastructure and -exacerbat[ed] the shortage of workers in the area by providing ‗too much' financial assistance to persons displaced by the storm, and ‗poach[ed]' workers from local construction firms.‖ 229 Short-term recovery efforts and disaster mitigation thus displaced longerterm rebuilding by starving local business of resources. 230 The problem is that disaster planning and response tends to focus on physical infrastructure. 231 Government, insurance, and other large businesses contribute resources to repair and rebuild roads, replace housing, and otherwise address physical damage in disaster-ravaged areas. Recent studies, however, show that social networks-as opposed to amount of aid or damage-are key to recovery. City planners in Tuscaloosa, Alabama have struggled with these issues in the aftermath of extensive tornado damage as they formulate a comprehensive rebuilding plan to create -multi-use corridors within the tornado recovery zone.‖ 233 Local business owners have been vocal in their opposition to a plan that could pose impediments to rebuilding damaged or destroyed businesses and that does not adequately clarify zoning issues.
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On the other hand, Tuscaloosa has an opportunity to address vulnerabilities, physical and social, for the longer term. Thus, plan advocates -see it as paving the way for a better city business district, more cohesive neighborhoods and an enhancement to the Tuscaloosa quality of life.‖ 235 However, setting the Tuscaloosa recovery plan aside, improvements to existing uses can become Utopianism if planners too readily give themselves over to an imagined future dotted with green spaces, organic grocery stores, and boutiques well stocked with artisanal crafts. To put the point gently, the priorities of those charged with city planning may not work equally well for every demographic group. Further, like any Utopian project, there is a danger that insufficient attention will be paid to the transitional dislocations that will ensue.
To be clear, our focus on bottom-up recovery efforts should not be confused with a blame-the-victim position or with a claim that government assistance programs are part of the problem. 236 Nor do we contend that the [VOL. 89:973
answer to natural disaster in urban settings is to couple zero-tolerance policing -minimalist supply-side interventions‖ designed to -cater[] explicitly to business, taxpayers, and the middle classes, for whom the restructured city must be made safe and welcoming.‖ 237 We reject a simplistic choice between identifying classes of victims and fostering individual responsibility. 238 Rather, we contend that disaster planning and response should recognize that individuals and communities may be both susceptible to harm and resilient. Local business has an important role to play in sustaining and creating the social capital that makes full recovery possible.
CONCLUSION
Publicly traded corporations aggregate capital from investors across the nation and worldwide. However, the residual beneficiaries of the firm are unlikely to live in the same community and will be rationally ignorant concerning the firm's activities. Dispersed shareholding may be a boon for efficient capital allocation, but it does not tend to build strong social ties between a national corporation and the communities where it operates. When the shareholders are local, they may have connections to the community through their business and through any number of other civic organizations.
Locally owned businesses are part of the community and contribute to the economic and social aspects of longer-term life recovery after disaster. Locally owned businesses will never match the Wal-Marts of the world in their ability to distribute vast quantities of blankets, portable generators, and, for that matter, Pop-Tarts, but they are essential to the disaster resilience of their communities.
237. Peck, supra note 236, at 704 (arguing that such policies represent -socially invasive interventions directed at a criminalized, feckless, and morally bankrupt class of the urban poor, from whom preferred citizens must be shielded at all costs‖).
238. Id. at 706 (summarizing the argument: -It was therefore not a lack of resources, private transportation, or out-of-town support systems that placed some of the most-needy New Orleans residents in the storm's path; it was the long-run consequences of urban welfarism-and its racialized cast of supported characters . . . .‖).
